The U.S. Petroleum Crisis of 1979 THE UNITED STATES experienced the second petroleum crisis of the decade in 1979. American consumers were told that the cause of the crisis was a decline in Iranian oil production from 5.8 million barrels a day (mmbd) in July 1978 to 445,000 barrels a day (mbd) in January 1979. The short-run consequences of the crisis were shortages of diesel fuel and gasoline during the months of May, June, and July. At the peak of the crisis the gasoline lines were as long as or longer than those in 1974. There were also suggestions that heating oil would be in short supply in the 1979-80 winter. The long-run consequences are higher prices of gasoline, heating oil, residual fuel oil and, eventually, higher prices of all products derived from petroleum.
increases in gasoline prices that far exceeded the rise in the cost of crude oil.
The price increases are understandable in view of the reduced availability of refined products. But the extent of the inventory buildup, which reduced the supply of those products to the market, raises questions about the role of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in those shortages. DOE requested the inventory buildup and ordered crude oil to be redistributed in a way that reduced the supply of gasoline and altered regional distribution. Further, DOE's gasoline price and allocation regulations made it profitable to withhold supplies from the market. A different DOE management strategy that discouraged stock building might have partially overcome the effects of the regulations and reduced the shortage.
Petroleum Supply and Demand during the First Quarter of 1979
Although the year began with inventories 7 percent below levels of a year earlier, there was no unusual buildup of inventories of crude oil or products in the refinery sector during the first quarter of 1979. The available data summarized in table 1 suggest that petroleum flows in 1979: 1 closely paralleled flows in 1978: 1.1 Compared with 1978:1, refinery output in 1979 :1 increased by 390 mbd or 2.4 percent, while distribution of products to the market increased by 260 mbd or 1.3 percent. Inventory changes and levels of product imports and exports were also almost identical in the two quarters. Although production of crude oil in the continental United States declined in 1979 :1, total domestic crude oil production matched the 1978 :1 level as Alaskan production increased from 993 1. To develop estimates of the sources of supply, I added domestic crude oil production, imports of crude oil, production and imports of natural gas liquids and condensate, and the change in inventories of crude oil and intermediate products (unfinished oils and natural gasoline). Exports of crude oil were then subtracted to obtain an estimate of total inputs. The estimate of refinery output is mine. Neither the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nor the U.S. Bureau of Mines publishes an aggregate statistic on the output of refineries. They do, however, publish data on total deliveries, changes in product inventories, and imports and exports of products. By adding these I was able to derive my estimate of refinery output. Because data on refinery output and inputs do not balance, I included a term "refinery gains and discrepancy." This item takes into account the volumetric expansion caused by refining. 
Petroleum Supply and Demand during the Second Quarter of 1979
The similarity between the patterns of distribution in 1978 and 1979 ended during the second quarter of 1979 when the industry embarked upon a strategy of inventory rebuilding. Indeed, the amount of inventory building was astonishing, if the preliminary data are to be believed. During the second quarter, deliveries to the market were cut 486 mbd below the levels of 1978:2, despite an increase in the amount of crude oil received by refineries (see table 3 of 266 mbd. The total potential supply of refinery input rose by 321 mbd (2.0 percent), although actual inputs rose by less than half a percent because inventories of crude oil and intermediate products were increased. Management of product inventories was also conservative. During the second quarter of 1978, refiners increased stocks of refined products at a rate of 223 mbd. During 1979, the data show that stocks were increased at a rate of 502 mbd. This difference alone reduced the supply of products available to the market by 279 mbd, or by 1.5 percent of the 1978:2 supply. 
The DOE's Reactions to the Shortage
The behavior of DOE in the 1979 crisis has been reviewed in many forums, often quite critically. However, most of these reviews have focused on public statements by officials of DOE and not on its programs. Here I examine five DOE programs that affected the supply of products available to the market: instructions to refiners to restrict the supply of gasoline sold to the market; development of the "buy/sell" program, which forced large refiners to sell crude oil to small refiners; instructions to the industry to build inventories, especially of heating oil; gasoline price-control regulations; and notice of intent to review pricing regulations governing crude oil during the peak of the crisis. Each of these programs is examined briefly below. It is essential that refiners enter the spring driving season with adequate gasoline stocks to meet seasonal demand requirements. We recognize that gasoline stocks are currently at adequate levels for this time of year, which is usually a period of low demand. Recent industry data indicate that total stocks are now in excess of 265 million barrels, which is less than last year's record high levels during the same period but above the average levels of previous years. Our concern is that these stocks not be drawn down precipitously as soon as the impacts of the Iranian shortfall are felt by refiners. Refiners are urged to keep stocks high enough to meet expected demand during the 1979 summer driving season, even if it is necessary to restrict somewhat the amount of surplus gasoline that is made available to purchasers currently [emphasis added].7
The implementation of these instructions had the effect of restricting the volume of gasoline available to service stations to between 80 and 90 percent of 1978 levels. This reduction was greater than the reduction in total gasoline supplies. From their total supply, refiners had to meet the full requirements of certain priority customers-such as farmers and persons providing emergency services-before meeting the needs of others. As the demands of those priority customers increased from the previous year, the supply to service stations was correspondingly reduced.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUY/SELL PROGRAM
In April 1979, DOE ordered the fifteen largest refiners to sell 7.8 million barrels of crude oil to smaller firms that were unable to obtain supplies on the world market at competitive prices. DOE stated:
The shortages of crude oil may require allocation of crude among refiners to avoid severe inequities. As smaller refiners have serious crude shortages, DOE will continue to direct larger refiners to sell crude oil to the smaller refiners under the current Buy/Sell program.8
Approximately 23 million barrels of crude oil were allocated to the small refineries during the second quarter; by mid-August, the sales ordered to small refineries through the third quarter totaled 41 million barrels.9 These transfers probably reduced the volume of gasoline produced in the second quarter because the refineries that purchased the crude oil had only a limited capacity to produce gasoline, while the refineries that sold it could have produced more. Based on a review of the gasoline production capacity of the recipients of the allocated crude oil, I estimate that between 5 million and 9 million barrels of potential gasoline production were lost in the second quarter, or 50 to 100 mbd.10
In addition to reducing the supply of gasoline, the buy/sell program appears to have affected the geographic distribution of crude oil and gasoline. This is because the primary recipients of the crude oil were refineries in the Midwest and the gulf coast areas, while the sellers were companies that were marketing throughout the nation.
INSTRUCTIONS TO BUILD HEATING INVENTORIES
In April, DOE turned its attention to the low stock of distillate fuel oil:
Distillate fuel oil stocks are at an unacceptably low level, and it is critical that these stocks be rebuilt to safe levels before the next heating season.... Unless petroleum demand is restrained, heating oil stocks would not be built to safe levels by next fall.1"
To remedy this problem, DOE stated:
The Department will work with refiners to establish individual distillate stock level targets for October 1, 1979 to reach a total distillate primary stock level of 240 MMB by October 1. Intermediate monthly targets also may be established. DOE will take steps to be prepared to require refinery yield shifts if this becomes necessary to build distillate stocks to safe levels.12 pronouncements. Two impacts were observed on domestic markets. First, excessive stocks of heating oil were accumulated.13 Second, companies may have been influenced to increase gasoline stocks in anticipation of the mandatory yield controls that DOE threatened to impose. These controls specified the percent of refiner output that had to be heating oil. Such controls were designed to curtail the output of gasoline. By building higher gasoline inventories, refiners could smooth out the month-tomonth distribution of gasoline despite the controls.
GASOLINE PRICE-CONTROL REGULATIONS
Price controls on gasoline may have also created an incentive to withhold gasoline from the market when the prices of crude oil were rising rapidly. The regulations allowed refiners to raise prices on gasoline sales each month to reflect increases in costs of crude oil incurred in the previous month. Thus, if a refiner's costs of crude oil increased by 2 cents per gallon in April, that refiner could raise the price of gasoline by 2 cents per gallon on May 1. Under this method of accounting (last in, first out) the price of any product produced before April but still in inventory on May 1 could also be increased. Whether such a strategy was profitable would depend on the cost of gasoline, on short-term carrying costs, and on the expected rate of increase in the average cost of crude oil. Assuming 45 cents per gallon as the total cost of production to the refiner (the approximate average cost in February) and an interest rate of 12 percent, this strategy would have been profitable only if a refiner expected the cost of crude oil to increase at a monthly rate of more than 0.5 cent to 0.7 cent per gallon.14 As table 2 shows, the monthly increase in the acquisi- 14. The range depends on the number of days that inventories are held. If they were held thirty days, the increase would be 0.5 cent per gallon. If they were held forty-five days, the required cost increase would be 0.7 cent per gallon. tion cost of crude oil to the refiner did not exceed 0.4 cent per gallon until February 1979, when it jumped to 0.8 cent per gallon. Then, after increasing 0.6 cent in March, gasoline rose 2.0 cents per gallon in April, 2.1 cents per gallon in May, and 3.8 cents per gallon in June.15 In spring 1979, most refiners knew with relative certainty that their costs of crude oil were going to rise rapidly because the time lag between purchase and receipt of imports was, in most cases, more than six weeks. Refiners also had the capacity to store the added inventories because inventory levels of crude oil and product were low. Moreover, most large refiners needed the flexibility provided by the last in-first out pricing provision; they otherwise were constrained by price controls-either because they had depleted their banked costs,'6 or because they were complying with the price restraint program of the Council on Wage and Price Stability.17 In summary, the refiners had the capacity and the knowledge to take advantage of this opportunity. Ironically, the instructions from DOE to the companies were to do precisely what was most profitable. 16. Banked costs provide a mechanism whereby DOE allows a producer to raise the price of a controlled product in some future month to recover costs he was unable to pass through in some previous month.
REVIEW OF PRICING REGULATIONS
17. By late 1978, many refiners had exhausted their banked costs. Some refiners who had not exhausted their banked costs were constrained by the profit margin test under President Carter's voluntary anti-inflation program. If they complied with this restraint, refiners would have had the same incentive to withhold product as described above, because the profit margin test permitted price increases to recover costs of raw materials.
18. Under the price controls for crude oil, the base period control level is the volume of daily oil output from a well that must be sold as "old" oil at a price of $6.00 a barrel. Production above this level is sold as "new" oil at a higher price. experience, producers could have inferred from the November announcement that future base-period control levels would probably be determined by the volume of old oil produced during the period of review by DOE. A producer could expect that every additional barrel of old oil produced daily during the review period would correspondingly increase the future number of barrels that would be classified as old oil. Thus increased production of old oil could have been expected to reduce present and future incomes."9 Conclusion I began by reviewing the pattern of supply of refined products in the United States during the first and second quarters of 1979. The pattern in the first quarter was similar to that of the same quarter in the previous year. In the second quarter of 1979, however, when the distribution of refined products to the market was curtailed so that inventories could be rebuilt, a shortfall arose between projected demand and actual supply. Although gasoline prices rose by almost 20 cents per gallon-much more than the 10 cents per gallon increase in the cost of crude oil-gasoline shortages occurred during the spring in many parts of the country.
It is clear that there were private incentives to build unusually large inventories in the spring. DOE chose not to override these incentives and, in fact, promoted a large increase in stocks. If DOE had correctly anticipated the availability of crude oil for the remainder of 1979, it would not have been necessary to encourage inventory accumulation in the second quarter. And it could have moderated the price increases at the consumer level by not permitting exceptional increases in the profit margins of refiners and dealers.
19. DOE's allocation regulations may have provided an additional motive to restrict gasoline supplies. The regulations require refiners to report as "surplus" the volume of production that exceeds the level of supply during the same period in the previous year. DOE then has ten days in which it may require the refiner to sell the product to a competitor's service station. Thus, when exercised, this regulation effectively prevents a refiner from increasing the supply of gasoline sold to its regular customers or service stations. During periods of plenty, such as 1976 and 1977, this rule was seldom used. However, as more refiners began to reduce the volume of gasoline allocated to the market in 1979, the chances increased that the rule would be imposed.
Discussion
SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS questioned the extent to which DOE ought to be blamed for the inventory buildup, gasoline shortages, and higher product prices during the second quarter of 1979. Most agreed that DOE's allocation system worsened the gasoline shortage. But they distinguished two issues regarding the inventory buildup: whether the DOE targets were appropriate and whether its actions changed private behavior. Arthur Okun pointed out that, in view of the uncertainty of supplies later in the year, a plan to build stocks in the spring was prudent. Robert Lawrence added that Philip Verleger offered no convincing model explaining desired inventories. Actual inventories were low by the end of March and a substantial buildup of stocks would have been expected even under normal circumstances. Given the abnormal circumstances of uncertain supplies and widespread expectations of higher prices, the buildup would almost certainly have been exceptionally large without encouragement by DOE. Christopher Sims reasoned that the release of price controls had created an incentive for private hoarding. Because the release of controls on crude oil prices was announced as a phased program, to be completed over many months, it created incentives for short-run supply restriction greater than that which existed when controls were in full force.
Robert Hall argued that DOE's policies had not altered longer run prices. Although he believed that regulations had unwisely held back price increases in the spring, prices were currently at market-clearing levels. He maintained that gasoline price regulations are ineffective and that gasoline prices soon reflect the marginal cost of crude oil. William Nordhaus pointed out that regulatory mistakes that increased demand in world spot markets, even temporarily, could permanently raise crude oil prices. High prices in spot markets appeared to encourage OPEC to raise prices, but subsequent easing of spot prices led them to constrain supplies.
